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MERIVIN v. SAFE DEP. & TR. CO.
EXERCISE OF A GENERAL POWER OF APPOINT-
MENT WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE
TO THE POWER
Merwin v. Sale Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore"
Under a declaration of trust executed by her uncle,
Mariah Louise Moore held an equitable life estate in the
trust fund of $12,000, with a power of appointment over the
remainder to "such -person or persons, in such shares and
proportions," as she should appoint by will. On April 21,
1934, the said life tenant died leaving a will which, after
directing payment of her debts, contained genera! pecuniary
legacies of $5,000 to a granddaughter and $2,000 each to
three other grandchildren. The will then concluded with a
residuary devise and bequest of "all the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed," to her
daughter and son. After payment of her debts and funeral
expenses, there remained only $4,000 of the individual assets
of the testatrix available for satisfaction of these general
pecuniary legacies. Both the pecuniary legatees and the
residuary legatees agreed that the power of appointment
was exercised by the will under the provisions of the Mary-
land Code, which provides: "Every devise and bequest
purporting to be of all real and personal property belonging
to the testator shall be construed to include also all property
over which he has a general power of appointment, unless
the contrary intention shall appear in the will or codicil
containing such devise or bequest."' However, they dis-
agreed as to how this $12,000 should be applied. The pecu-
niary legatees contended that the entire will operated as an
exercise of this power of appointment, and thus that the
trust estate should be used to pay the deficiency of their
pecuniary legacies. On the other hand, the residuary lega-
tees contended that the general residuary clause alone oper-
ated as an exercise of this power, and thus the entire trust
estate must be distributed to them. The trustee filed suit
to determine what disposition of these trust funds should be
made. The trial court adopted the theory of the pecuniary
legatees, and ordered payment of the deficiency of their
legacies out of the trust estate. The residuary legatees
appealed. Held, Affirmed.
This was a testamentary power of appointment, and
therefore in Maryland could not have been exercised for the
188 A. 803 (Md. 1937).
'Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 39.
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benefit of the donee's own estate or creditors," yet the
parties assumed that it was a "gleneral power of appoint-
ment" within the meaning of this statute. Such a power
is clearly not ".general" within the meaning of the- term
under the English decisions, since it could not have been
exercised for the donee's own benefit.4  However, since this
statute was enacted by a Maryland legislature, it must be
construed according to our Court of Appeals' interpretation
of the word "general". In Prince de Bearns v. Winans' an
identical testamentary power of appointment was expressly
held to have been exercised under the provisions of this
statute, thus impliedly regarding a power, which could be
exercised for the benefit of any person except the donee or
his creditors, as a "general" power within the meaning of
this statute.
Prior to the enactment of this statute a power of appoint-
ment could only be exercised by three methods: (1) By an
express reference to the power itself or to the instrument
creating the power.8 (2) By a specific reference to the
property which is the subject matter of the power. (Where
the power is testamentary this method of exercise occurs
where the testator makes a specific devise or bequest of the
property itself.T ) (3) By a provision which would be in-
operative except as an exercise of the power.8 Only under
this method would the exercise of the power result from
facts not apparent upon the face of the instrument.
This third method restricted the introduction of extrinsic
evidence showing an intention of the donee to exercise the
power, to cases where the provision would otherwise be en-
tirely inoperative. Thus, if the donee held any individual
property upon which this provision would be operative, ex-
trinsic evidence as to its inadequacy would be inadmissible.
Most of the cases arising under the third method were cases
involving wills containing, either general pecuniary legacies
where the donee 's individual estate was entirely inadequate,
or a general residuary devise and bequest. In the early case
of Nannock v. Horton' the English courts took the position
that evidence of the inadequacy of the donee's individual
estate to satisfy the general legacies in his will was inad-
8 Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16, 1 L. . A. 545 (1888).
' In Leser v. Burnet, 46 Fed. (2nd) 756 (C. C. A. 4th 1931), an identical
power was held not to be a "general power of appointment" under the Fed-
eral Estate Tax.
111 Md. 434, 74 At. 626 (1909).
Benesch v. Clark, 49 Md. 497 (1878).
'Cooper v. Raines, 70 Md. 282, 17 AtM 79 (1889).
'Balls v. Dampman, supra note 8.
7 Yes. Jr. 391, 32 Eng. Rep. 158 (1802).
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niissible to show aii intention to exercise a power of appoint-
mont. In that case the donee had a small amount of indi-
vidual personal property which would pass under these
general pecuniary legacies, so no pecuniary legacy was
totally inoperative without the exercise of the power. This
decision was clearly followed by our Court of Appeals in
Patterson v. Wilson"0 where the Court denied that a general
residuary clause could operate as an exercise of a power of
appointment, since the donee had individual property, both
real and personal, which would pass under such residuary
clause. However, in Balls v. Dampman11 a general devise
and bequest of "all my property, real,1 personal and
mixed" was held to constitute an exercise of a power of ap-
pointment over real property, since the donee owned no
individual real estate but only personalty at his death. The
opinion carefully points out that the devise of real property
would be "entirely inoperative and nugatory" unless it
operated as an exercise of this power of appointment. Thus,
until the above statute was enacted in Maryland in 1888,
general legacies and general residuary devises and bequests
were ineffective as an exercise of a power of appointment,
except in the rare cases where the donee held no individual
property which would pass under the clause in question.
This narrow construction of the common law has been
repudiated in most of the American jurisdictions, and ex-
trinsic evidence, showing the inadequacy as well as the total
lack of individual property, has been held admissible to
prove an exercise of a power of appointment by general
legacies or general residuary devises and bequests."2 The
inconvenience and injustice which resulted under this nar-
row construction of the common law was severely criticized
by numerous English judges,"4 until in 1837 a statute was
enacted in England providing that a general devise of all real
or personal property should operate as an exercise of any
power of appointment of the testator, unless a contrary
intention should appear on the will."5 This statute not only
abolished the narrow construction that no extrinsic evidence
was admissible to prove the inadequacy of the donee's indi-
vidual estate, but went far beyond the majority American
view, which admits such evidence, to the extent of creating
a presumption in favor of the exercise of all powers in the
10 64 Md. 193, 1 Att. 68 (1885).
"Supra note 8.
"Italics ours.
"Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Thayer, 105 Conn. 57, 134 Ati. 155
(1920).
1' Hughes v. Turner, 3 Myl. & K. 68, 40 Eng. Rep. 1254 (1834).
15St. 7 Will. IV and 1 Vict, C. 26, See. .27.
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donee, if his will purports to devise and bequeath all real
and personal property. Not only does the statute create a
presumption in favor of the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment by a general residuary clause, but permits such pre-
sumption to be rebutted only by evidence appearing on the
will itself. To the extent that the common law rule re-
quired a power to be exercised on the face of the will, coil-
versely the statute requires the non-exercise to be shown
on the face of the will. It must be noted that the English
statute applies to all powers, both special and general, which
the testator has power to exercise by wilL
This English statute was the model for our present
Maryland one. However, it is especially noticeable that
the Maryland statute is'expressly restricted to general
powers, thus leaving the problem of the exercise of special
powers to the rules of the common law as developed in
Patterson v. Wilson 6 and Balls v. Dampman.1  Like its
English counterpart, our Maryland statute creates a pre-
sumption in favor of the exercise of general powers, which
can only be rebutted by a contrary intention appearing in
the will. The only Maryland case involving a construction
of this clause, "unless the contrary intention shall appear
in the will," is the case of Gassin.qer v. Thillman.8 That
case held that a general residuary clause, in a will executed
prior to the creation of a reserved general power of appoint-
ment, did not operate as an exercise of such power, since a
contrary intention appeared from the fact that the testator
reserved in himself the power subsequent to the drafting
of the residuary clause in his will. Thus a contrary inten-
tion appeared on the face of the will as disclosed by the
date of its publication.
The statute describes the type of devise and bequest,
which shall operate as an exercise of general powers, as
"every devise and bequest purporting to be of all real and
personal property belonging to the testator." By this is
clearly meant a general residuary clause. Whether the
will contains other general pecuniary legacies, as in this
case, or only a general residuary clause is immaterial.
However, the statute merely described such a clause as in-
cluding all property subject to a general power of appoint-
ment, without expressly providing that such property shall
pass under the clause itself or under the entire will. This
was the problem presented in this case, since the individual
'* Supra note 10.
z, Supra note 3.
160 ,Md. 194, 15.3 At. 19 (1930).
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property of the testatrix was insufficient to the extent of
$7,000 of satisfying the general pecuniary legacies.
If the Court had construed the statute as passing the
property subject to the general power under the residuary
clause only, then the intention of the testatrix as disclosed
by the use of a general residuary clause would be defeated.
A gift of "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
real, personal and mixed" clearly implies an intention that
all general pecuniary legacies be paid in full. Until all are
paid in full there is no residue to pass under such a clause.
The Court carefully pointed out that the statute was in-
tended to apply to wills conveying all of the testator's prop-
erty whether by a single clause or as the combined results
of distinct clauses. To accomplish this the power must be
exercised by the entire will and not by a single clause, i. e.
the residuary clause.
If the property subject to the power passes under the
entire will and not merely under the residuary clause, two
problems arise: (1) Will such property then be subject to
the claims of the donee's creditors? Clearly in jurisdictions
permitting the donee of a general power to appoint it to his
own estate or creditors, the property becomes subject to the
donee 's creditors."9 However, in Maryland since the power
was testamentary only, it cannot be exercised directly or in-
directly for the benefit of the donee's creditors." (2) Will
such property be used to pay all the general pecuniary
legacies in full? The opinion points out that if such prop-
erty is used to pay the general pecuniary legacies, the inten-
tion of the testatrix to provide for all the pecuniary legacies
in full before providing for the residuary legatees is accom-
plished. This construction operated to enforce the order
of priority of payment of the legacies as disclosed by the
arrangement of the will, and is fully supported by decisions
in other states2
I Clapp v. Ingraham, 120 Mass. 200 (1879).
2: Balls v. Danmpman, supra note 3.
,s Moran v. Cornell. 49 R. 1. 308, 142 Ad. 605 (128).
